Financial Vulnerability in the Central and Eastern European Countries by Andreou, Irène & Zdzienicka-Durand, Aleksandra
Financial Vulnerability in the Central and Eastern
European Countries
Ire`ne Andreou, Aleksandra Zdzienicka-Durand
To cite this version:
Ire`ne Andreou, Aleksandra Zdzienicka-Durand. Financial Vulnerability in the Central and
Eastern European Countries. Working Paper GATE 2009-07. 2009. <halshs-00374148>
HAL Id: halshs-00374148
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00374148
Submitted on 8 Apr 2009
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Groupe d’An
Éc
UMR 
 
 
 
DOCUMENTS DE TRAVAI
 
W.P. 0
  
Financial Vulnerabilit
Eastern Europe
 
 
Irène Andreou, Alek
 
 
 
 
Avril 2
 
GATE Groupe d’Analyse et
UMR 5824 d
93 chemin des Mouilles –
B.P. 167 – 69131
Tél. +33 (0)4 72 86 60 60 – 
Messagerie électroniqu
Serveur Web : ww
 
  
 
GATE 
alyse et de Théorie 
onomique 
5824 du CNRS L - WORKING PAPERS 
9-07 
y in the Central and 
an Countries 
sandra Zdzienicka 
009 
 de Théorie Économique 
u CNRS 
 69130 Écully – France 
 Écully Cedex 
Fax +33 (0)4 72 86 60 90 
e gate@gate.cnrs.fr
w.gate.cnrs.fr 
 
 
FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY IN THE 
CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
Irène ANDREOU*, Aleksandra ZDZIENICKA* 
 
First version: November, 2008 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this work we use a panel probit model to analyze the sources of financial 
vulnerability in four Central and Eastern European countries. The 
incontestable advantages of applying this method, associated with some 
elements of the non-parametric approach applied during the initial 
selection of the used indicators, allow us to accomplish, rather well, this 
objective. 
Indeed, the model performs considerably well in the sample and the whole 
approach can provide useful and supportive instruments for the study of 
financial vulnerabilities in transition economies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After their EU adhesion, the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs 
hereafter) prepare themselves to replace the national currencies with the euro, and even if this 
process brings incontestable benefits for each country, its costs and challenges cannot be 
ignored. Indeed, the most obvious price to pay for the common currency is the loss of 
independent monetary policy as a tool to deal with asymmetric shocks, increased capital 
inflows, and other financial turbulences. So, decisions on the timing of the euro adoption should 
be preceded by careful consideration of these risks and the substantial differences between the 
candidate countries and the common currency area (Schadler et al., 2005).  
The CEECs have started their transition process almost 20 years ago and even if their 
economies show in many respects increasing similarities to developed economies, they still 
present some characteristics pointing to potential sources of increased financial vulnerability 
that have even increased in the recent period. The main objective of this paper is to study these 
vulnerabilities.  
To do so, we focus on the four biggest CEECs, namely Hungary, Poland, and the Czech 
and Slovak Republics during the 1995-2006 period. The underling characteristics of these 
countries point to the several common features, especially when we compare them to other 
CEECs such as the Baltic countries. Moreover, these countries have been operating an 
independent monetary policy for most of the studied period (see Appendix C), and this implies 
greater changes in the macroeconomic framework that will be necessary during the euro 
adoption, than in the case of the other countries. So, even if country-specific characteristics are 
certainly well present, we can explore this first regularity and adopt a pooled approach, using 
the advantages of panel data (Baltagi, 2008). 
To determine the potential sources of increased financial vulnerability, we apply the 
existing theoretical and empirical literature on financial crises. Indeed, there are few studies 
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treating sources of financial vulnerability directly, but the aftermath of the financial crises 
since the end of the previous century has entailed an explosion of research in this last field. 
These works have allowed the identification of certain characteristics (vulnerabilities) of an 
economy that may make it prone to financial turbulence. Some of their contributions are also 
employed in our study. For example, we define an increased financial vulnerability situation 
using a variant of the market pressure index developed by Kaminsky et al. (1997), and to select 
indicators of financial vulnerability we adopt a two-step approach using the standard non-
parametric signaling and non-linear (binary model) methods. However, despite many common 
features in our panel sample, we fear the presence of biasing country-specific effects and this is 
why we apply the panel probit model that takes these effects into consideration: a population-
average model with a random-effects estimator.  
The model constructed in this way has a good in-sample performance indentifying 
contagion, growing private sector indebtedness, short-term capital inflows, and interest and 
exchange rate volatility as the most significant indicators of increased financial vulnerability.  
So, even if the predictive power of this kind of method is known to be limited, the model may 
help determine particular features of the new EU countries and potential sources of financial 
weaknesses. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes some underling 
characteristics of the CEECs that have played an important role in the recent period. Section 3 
focuses on the existing research on financial turbulence. Section 4 concentrates on 
methodological issues. The estimation results are interpreted in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.   
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2. Characteristic features of CEECs' economies 
 
Like we mentioned before, the CEECs' economies started their transition to a market 
economy almost 20 years ago and today this process is nearly accomplished. The speed of 
transformation has been undoubtedly influenced by EU accession and convergence of the new 
economies to EU level. However, in most cases, the CEECs' real convergence, that is 
convergence of the level of income and structure of the economy to EU standards, progresses 
rather slowly. Indeed, the income gap measured by GDP per capita (at PPP) varies between 45 
percent of the EU-15 average level in Poland, 57 percent in Slovakia and 60 percent in 
Hungary to 70 percent in the Czech Republic1. These figures corroborate the fact that the 
catching-up process in the CEECs is far from over. 
Another characteristic feature concerns the financial sectors. The CEECs’ financial 
markets remain underdeveloped and the financial sector is centered on the banking sector. 
Indeed, the average market capitalization accounts for about 30 per cent of GDP compared with 
130 per cent in the euro zone and the domestic banking sector is growing rapidly. This last 
development has been clearly visible trough the rapid growth of bank credit to the private 
sector (Figure 1). Its level is far from that of the euro-zone, but the speed of the process has 
brought some fears about potential overheating and possible development of asset price 
bubbles. On the other hand, banks are dominated by international banking groups. Their 
shares in total banking assets vary from 70 percent in Poland, 80 percent in Hungary to almost 
100 percent in the Czech and Slovak Republics. This brings us to another important 
characteristic: capital inflows. 
                                                 
1 Raiffeisen Bank ''CEE Banking Sector Report 2008'' 
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Capital flows into these economies are very large, volatile and, since the end of 1990's, 
rather unrestricted. They have accounted in average for about seven per cent of GDP over the 
studied period and their volatility is rather high (the standard deviation of net annual flows 
over the 1995 - 2006 period varies between 60 and about 100 per cent). Capital inflows usually 
take the form of foreign direct investment (over 60 per cent of total inflows), but an increase of 
short-term capital inflows can also be noticed. Since the rate of return on investment is and will 
remain relatively high in the new countries due to the scarcity of physical capital, these capital 
inflows can persist during and after the euro adoption. This last tendency can also be reflected 
in the rather large current account disequilibrium. Indeed, the high rate of investment, 
especially compared to the level of saving, can explain the relatively large current account 
deficits concerning almost the entire region (Figure 1). Moreover, capital inflows contribute at 
least partly2 to the considerable real appreciation of the CEECs' currencies, but also their 
volatility can explain these countries’ exchange rate fluctuations.  
The last important feature mentioned here concerns the large fiscal deficit of all studied 
countries. For example in 2006, fiscal deficit reached 2.7% of GDP in the Czech Republic, 3.6% 
in Slovakia and Poland and 9.2 % in Hungary. These deficits are mostly explained by the 
structural problems of the new countries, which will tend to increase with future demographic 
developments.  
These aforementioned characteristics constitute potential sources of financial 
vulnerability not only during the period before the euro adoption, but also, as could be noted 
recently, in the context of global financial and economic turmoil. In the next section, we try to 
go into more detail concerning this problem, by providing a brief description of the general 
empirical literature on financial crises and of work on the CEECs' vulnerabilities as well. 
 
                                                 
2 Other factors explaining common real appreciation include the Balassa-Samuelson effect, the price and tax system 
transformation, or initial undervaluation (Schadler et al., 2005), but also recent loose monetary conditions and 
''excessive'' credit growth (Christensen, 2008). 
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3. Research on financial turbulence 
 
The proliferation of financial crises at the end of the last century resulted in the 
explosion of empirical studies on the subject. Many authors put efforts in developing a warning 
system that may help in monitoring whether a country may be subject to a potential crisis. 
Their methods differ in many aspects from crisis definition, to analyzed countries, to the 
monitored variables chosen (i.e. indicators of financial vulnerability) to the period of study and 
data frequency. Generally, even if some analyses employ more than one methodology, we can 
distinguish three or four main groups of empirical work3. 
The first group of studies, the most common, uses parametric methods in the form of 
non-linear models (probit, logit). The binary dependent variable relates the probability of a 
crisis to a set of explanatory variables. The incontestable advantage of this method is the 
possibility to incorporate correlation among variables (which do not need to be dichotomous) 
and the possibility to use the standard statistical tests. These discrete choice models 
determining the causes of crises, allow us to assess indirectly the probability of their 
occurrence, but do not permit us to test the probability of their timing4. 
The second group of non-parametric methods uses a large set of variables to indicate the 
vulnerability to crises. The authors applying this method suppose that the particular behavior 
of some indicators may be useful in crisis prediction. Indeed, a warning signal of potential 
financial turbulence is sent when the crisis index and vulnerability indicators exceed some 
threshold values. This method has good in-sample effectiveness, but fails in out-sample 
predictions of crises5. 
                                                 
3 Our classification is principally based on the ones by Collins (2003) and Abiad, (2003).  
4 The method was initiated by Eichengreen et al. in 1996, used by Frankel and Rose in 1996, Berg and Patillo in 
1998, but also by many others such as Schardax in 2002, and Collins in 2003. Some authors preferred the logit 
specification (Bussière and Fratzscher in 2002). 
5 This approach was initiated by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz in 1995, popularized by Kaminsky and Reinhart in 
1996, and developed by Kaminsky et al. in 1997 and Goldstein et al. in 2000. The signaling method was also applied 
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  A third group of methods (detailed in Kaminsky et al., 1997, and subsequently) includes 
a qualitative discussion without formal tests and stylized facts about the period leading up to 
and directly following crisis periods. Moreover, some parametric and non-parametric tests are 
used to determine the difference between crises and periods of tranquility.  
  The last group of empirical works includes such methods as the Markov regime 
switching model, artificial neutral network (ANN) analysis, value at risk (VaR) models, or 
Fisher discriminant analysis. These methods try to address the main limitation of the standard 
approaches, namely the fact that future crisis prediction is based on crisis history itself, i.e. ex 
post chosen indicators, the market pressure index, etc. 
On the other hand, the literature on financial vulnerabilities in CEECs has been 
growing rapidly since the first decade of their transition process, but the perspective of the 
EMU enlargement gave even more impetus to their development.  
Work in this field is very heterogeneous.  Some authors proceed to overall analysis of 
potential vulnerabilities using a qualitative method, describing the stylized facts of the studied 
economies (Backé and Wojcik, 2003), regrouping existing analytical and empirical works to 
draw conclusions (Schadler et al., 2005). Certain studies concentrate on vulnerability analysis 
from a particular point of view such as a balance sheet approach (Menegatti and Roubini, 2006) 
or external sustainability (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). A common way of tackling the 
financial vulnerability problems is to treat them one by one. Indeed, empirical studies analyze 
separately the probability of current account volatility or exchange rate volatility, credit booms 
or foreign capital flow reversals.  
  To our knowledge, there are only few empirical studies (Krkoska, 2000, Schardax, 2002) 
treating vulnerability to financial crises in transition countries using traditional approaches. 
Usually some CEECs are included in more general analyses on developing countries (Kaminsky 
et al., 1997; Edison, 2000). The reasons for this are obvious: limited availability and reliability 
                                                                                                                                                                    
to some transition countries by Edison in 2000, Schardax in 2002, Brüggemann and Linne in 2002, and Andreou, 
Dufrénot, Sand-Zantman and Zdzienicka in 2007.}. 
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of the data, a small number of crisis episodes, rather weak statistical significance of the models, 
etc. Therefore, these approaches focusing on a very heterogonous group of countries do not 
allow for the confirmation of the relevance of the theoretical assumptions and the selected 
indicators of vulnerability. 
In our work, like we mentioned before, we try nevertheless to analyze the CEECs' 
financial vulnerabilities within the traditional framework. So, in order to analyze the sources of 
an increased financial vulnerability in the case of the studied countries, we try to associate the 
two most popular methods: the standard non-parametric signaling method and the non-linear 
method (binary panel model). However, before doing this we must first define the situation of 
an increased financial vulnerability and its potential indicators.  
 
4. Methodology 
 
4.1.  Defining financial vulnerability 
 
It is rather difficult to clearly define what a situation of increased financial vulnerability 
actually is. One can describe it as a situation that can lead an economy into financial crisis, but 
in this case we still face the problem of the definition of the financial crisis itself. However, 
since this aspect has been largely discussed in the literature, we can rely on previous works for 
both assessments. 
Indeed, financial vulnerability can manifest itself in several ways, such as severe 
pressure on the domestic currency with high costs on the external balance, banking system 
and/or debt problems. This is why we decide to adopt a similar criterion for the definition of an 
increased financial vulnerability as that used for a crisis definition. We construct the index, 
similar to the commonly used market pressure index that can be defined as follows:  
     (1) 
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where, δREERt stands for the real effective exchange rate variation and δRESERVESt for the 
variation in the domestic foreign exchange reserves. σ1i and σ2i indicate the volatility of the 
changes occurring in the real exchange rate and foreign reserves, which are measured by the 
standard deviation of these two variables.  
We use the real rather than nominal exchange rate to obtain a more realistic view of 
turbulence episodes in transition countries, since during the period under analysis these 
countries have adopted various exchange rate regimes. Moreover, to avoid the risk that an 
increased financial vulnerability situation can be misidentified, we include the domestic foreign 
exchange reserves variation. 
Finally, we can say that an increased financial vulnerability (IFV) situation 
occurs when pressures in the exchange rate market and domestic foreign exchange 
reserves losses are considerable, i.e. they exceed a certain threshold value c. 
This situation can be described using the following definition:  
 
   (2) 
 
The threshold value can be defined as:  
 
  (3) 
 
Where  is the empirical mean of the financial vulnerability index and is its standard 
deviation. We set the value of δ at 0.75. In the case of financial crises this value usually varies 
between 1.5 and 3 (Edison, 2000), but as we stressed before, the situation of increased financial 
vulnerability can precede crisis onset, and it is this situation that we seek to pinpoint.  
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   This value presents another incontestable advantage: the country can face a situation of 
increased vulnerability without actually going into a financial crisis and the index thus defined 
is still able to detect it.   
 
4.2. Indicators of financial vulnerability 
  
On the basis of the existing theoretical works6 and empirical research on financial 
crises, as well as empirical analyses of the transition economies, we can distinguish several 
potential sources of financial vulnerability (Table 1). Indeed, most of these countries show (i) 
large macroeconomic disequilibria. The need for new financing to cover the still 
considerable fiscal7 and widening current account deficits, but also the increasing potential cost 
of this financing can be considered as the most probable source of financial vulnerability in 
transition countries.  Moreover, the way that these (ii) deficits are financed, i.e. by issuing 
short - term foreign-denominated debt rather than long term bonds, equities, or foreign direct 
investment, may also constitute an additional source of vulnerability. 
In the case of crises or adverse shocks, a country can face the problem of raising the new 
funds and honoring existing debts, especially when the easier way to deal with external 
imbalances - domestic currency depreciation - increases the foreign-denominated debt burden. 
Finally, past and ongoing current and fiscal deficits can lead to doubts about the authorities' 
ability to reduce the unsustainable accumulation of debt (Roubini, 2001). Indeed, intertemporal 
solvency requires that the country's internal and external debt must be stable and its increase 
over time can lead to a debt, and currency and general financial crises (Reinhart, 2002).  
Some potential sources of financial vulnerability can also be found at the (iii) financial 
sector level. In the CEECs, especially in the new EU countries, such distortions as poor 
                                                 
6 Traditionally, academic research on financial crisis and their causes can be described on the basis of three 
generation models 
7 We exclude this indicator from the analysis due to data availability problems. 
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regulation or government guarantees are usually irrelevant, but others, like credit booms, can 
increase financial instability. Indeed, growth in permanent income, large investment 
opportunities and the perspective of the euro adoption will attract foreign capital inflows and 
lead to rapid bank credit growth to the private sector (Enoch and Ötker-Robe (editors), 2007). 
On the other hand, the credit boom may entail banking sector illiquidity and insolvency 
problems, an overheating of the economy or asset price bubbles. Increased capital inflows can 
also lead to excessive and destabilizing (from an economic point of view) volatility in interest 
and exchange rates (Aizenman and Riera-Crichton, 2006). Moreover, dealing with the above-
mentioned issues without a fully independent and credible monetary policy would constitute an 
additional source of vulnerability. Indeed, recent financial crisis history shows that (iv) fixed 
and “heavily managed” exchange rates have doubtlessly contributed to their onset (Bubula 
and Ötker-Robe, 2003). In the case of the studied transition countries, the euro adoption 
process, especially the necessity to peg their exchange rates to the euro during at least two 
years within the limits of the ERM II arrangement, may increase underling existing economic 
and financial vulnerabilities, such as capital account volatility. 
  Still, some other important sources of vulnerability, (v) external shocks, stay outside 
of these countries' control, especially in the era of financial liberalization. Prior to the ERM II 
period, authorities dispose of some limited tools to deal with such shocks. However, some 
phenomena, such as contagion, usually stay beyond the authorities' direct control in any case.  
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After this preliminary analysis of potential sources of financial vulnerability and in 
order to construct a robust system detecting financial vulnerability in transition economies we 
apply two different approaches.  
First we identify the variables8 with the best predictive power using the signaling 
method, and then we include them in a binomial probit model. By doing this we check the 
validity of the functional specification (i.e. significant variables with the expected signs) 
between the chosen variables and the dependent variable of increasing financial vulnerability 
in the countries under consideration9.  
 
4.3. Selecting the best - performing indicators: the signaling approach 
 
The non-parametric signaling approach used to select the best-performing indicators is 
based on the assumption that some variables’ behavior is different before the financial crisis 
and during the tranquil period. In practice, this procedure necessitates the determination of a 
threshold value that, when crossed, will indicate a change in the prior-to-crisis-variable 
behavior.  This threshold value should not be set too high or too low. The first case would result 
in too many missed signals while the second could result in an excessively high number of 
wrong signals. The most common way to determine this optimal threshold value is to select the 
one that minimizes the noise-to-signal ratio. 
  To calculate the noise-to-signal ratio (see Appendix A for more details), we assume that 
a variable signals a crisis situation if it exceeds some threshold value before the crisis actually 
occurs (our “crisis window” is set at four quarters before the onset of the financial turbulence). 
                                                 
8 We use quarterly data for the period 1995-2006 provided by the IMF International Financial Statistics, National 
Statistics Offices and the EMBI data on http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/infoeco.html.  
For a more detailed description, refer to Appendix B. 
9 For a more detailed description see Krznar (2004), to which this stage of our work is the closest from a 
methodological point of view.  The author, applying some elements of the signaling approach and running the probit 
model estimations, obtains a high level of predictive power in the sample. 
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Given this, four situations can occur: the variable signals a crisis and the crisis takes place (A) 
or not (B), and the variable does not signal the crisis, but this one occurs (C) or not (D). The 
noise-to-signal ratio is the ratio of bad signals to good ones:  
 
    (4) 
  
Table 1 above associates the previously selected variables to their noise-to-signal ratios. 
Usually, only the variables for which the noise-to-signal ratio does not exceed one are selected 
as the best indicators of financial turbulence. Therefore, in our case, the selected variables 
perform relatively well, and that's why we try to choose only those variables for which the 
noise-to signal ratio is well inferior to one as potential indicators of financial vulnerability.  
 
4.4. The Probit Model 
 
Before the detailed presentation of the probit model three remarks need to be made.  
• Since the financial vulnerability of an economy increases with the number of 
indicators signaling it, the best-performing indicators can be regrouped in a 
composite indicator. This indicator, besides its information role, allows us to 
indirectly measure the conditional probability of increasing financial vulnerability. 
This method performs well when the signaling variables, transformed into a step 
function, show a clear differentiated behavior prior to a crisis and under normal 
conditions, but otherwise obviously entails information losses.   
• This and another limit of the signaling approach can be addressed by applying the 
binary method. Moreover, it is a plausible assumption that the relationship between 
the independent variables and the dependent one cannot be effectively explained by 
the step function, but can alternatively be assessed using a binary non-linear model  
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(see Berg and Pattillo, 1999).  However, the introduction of a large number of 
independent variables in the model increases the probability of linear dependence 
between individual independent variables. The consequence is that we can meet 
difficulties in inverting the matrix of independent variables (i.e. a near-singular 
matrix), to evaluate the model parameters. So, in the case of a large number of well-
performing indicators, such as ours, some preliminary selection of the variables is 
still necessary. As mentioned before, the signaling method is used for this purpose. 
Then, the relationship between the pre-selected indicators and the dependent 
variable is examined by applying the probit model. 
• However, the presence of individual effects in the panel data makes the use of the 
standard probit model more complicated. Indeed, since the number of error term 
parameters increases with the number of countries, it cannot be consistently 
estimated for a fixed time period10. In this case, a popular solution has been the use 
of the panel probit model and the random-effects estimator. 
 
The panel probit model can be described by the following equation: 
 
,    (5) 
where  is a latent variable, but we can observe the binary variable, which is equal to 1 if  
is superior to 0, i.e. the event happens for country i at time t, and is equal to 0 otherwise. 
We can decompose the error term into two components , where i.i.d.  
and i.i.d. Both are independent of each other and of the 11  
                                                 
10 See Baltagi (2008) for a more detailed explanation of the incidental parameters problem. 
11 Since ,  for the realizations of  for each i are correlated, which complicates the derivation of 
maximum likelihood involving T-dimensional integrals.  However, to achieve this, Butler and Moffitt (1982) 
suggested the use of the Gaussian-Hermite quadrature procedure. 
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To measure the effects of the increased financial vulnerability indicators on its actual 
occurrence, we estimate a population-average model. This specification models the marginal 
expectation of the dependant variables across the population, i.e. averages it across random 
effects. The estimation results are then tested for the expected sign and the statistical 
significance of the coefficients in the equation, and the insignificant variables with unexpected 
signs are eliminated. Finally, we analyze the estimation results of the final specifications and 
test their performance, i.e. the goodness-of-fit of the model.  
 
4.5. Assessing the model's  performance 
 
One way of testing the model’s performance is via the Likelihood Ratio (LR), which is 
distributed as a χ2 statistic with k-1 degrees of freedom, where k-1 is the number of 
independent variables in the model, under the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
variables are all jointly equal to zero. The way to test for LR significance is provided by the 
“Probability (LR stat)” values. These measures show the general statistical significance of the 
models at the 1% level.  
We can test the models for their predictive power in the sample. The most commonly 
used method consists in comparing the predicted probabilities of increased financial 
vulnerability periods with their actual occurrence. To calculate the percentage of outcomes 
correctly predicted, we take the prediction in observation i as 1 if pi is grater then 0.5, which is 
our probability threshold, and 0 if it is less. In general, when this goodness-of-fit measure is 
considered, our models perform considerably well in the sample. 
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However, despite the rather good performance in assessing the determinants of financial 
vulnerability, the model provides only a general direction of the influence of each variable on 
the increase in financial vulnerability. Indeed, like we mentioned before, the probit model is 
non-linear, so in order to interpret the estimated coefficients of the independent variables as 
their marginal contributions to the dependent variable probability, we should assume a certain 
value for the explanatory variables. 
The most common way to do this is to evaluate these marginal effects at the mean of 
each significant variable according to the following formula:  
 
(6) 
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where  is the density function of a standard normal distribution. 
Table 3 reports the effect of these quantity changes in the independent variables on the 
predicted probability of increased financial vulnerability.  
 
Table 3: Marginal Impact of Variables on Financial Vulnerability Increase 
 
The figures in the table should be interpreted as follows: a one percent increase in short-
term capital inflows from their mean increases the probability of the occurrence of increased 
financial vulnerability by 0.1%. 
 
5. Interpreting the estimation findings 
 
The situation of increased financial vulnerability in the CEECs, over the 1995-2006 
period, was strongly connected to the Russian financial turbulence, which advocates in favor of 
strong spillover effects through the financial links between the two zones. This argument can 
be confirmed by the performance of the EMBI indicator in financial vulnerability prediction, 
which is rather good. This seems to underline the impact of contagious financial turbulence in 
all emerging markets. An important economic indicator of increasing financial vulnerability 
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can also be found in the growing private sector indebtedness, given by the equity-to-debt ratio. 
However, we are rather cautious about the predictive power of this indicator, since it can be 
biased by the size of the equity market, which remains considerably smaller compared to the 
bond one.  The next two indicators, real appreciation and short-term capital inflows are rather 
standard signals of growing financial problems, but while the role of short-term capital inflows 
is confirmed by our parametric model, real appreciation appears to be insignificant.  On the 
other hand, we find a significant functional relation between exchange rate volatility, 
measured by the so-called “z-score” (Ghosh et al., 2002), and increasing financial vulnerability. 
The last two findings can be explained by the fact that while real appreciation can be seen as a 
“continuous process”, due to higher productivity growth in the tradable sector or investors’ 
optimism concerning the CEECs’ economic performance, exchange rate volatility can indicate 
just the opposite. Indeed, it can be explained by its sensitivity to economic shocks, such as 
terms of trade shocks, capital inflows or other external turbulence (Aizenman and Riera-
Crichton, 2006). Here, it seems worth stressing that growth deceleration also contributes to an 
increase in financial vulnerability. Moreover, the CEECs’ experience confirms rather common 
findings: the fact that interest rate volatility is undoubtedly a good sign of financial 
vulnerability in emerging markets (Edwards, 1998). It also confirms the fact that financial 
turbulence is usually a consequence of the financial liberalization process, or that financial 
vulnerability can be signaled by a decrease in commercial bank deposits.  
  The impact of other indicators on increasing financial vulnerability seems to be less 
important or even insignificant. In the case of some variables, such as the current account 
deficit, this can be explained by the fact that they are financed, for the most part, by foreign 
direct investment that counts, like we mentioned before, for 60 percent of total capital inflows 
(on average). On the other hand, the weak performance of domestic-credit-related variables, 
such as bank credit to the private sector, can be attributed to the fact that the so-called ''credit 
boom'' is a rather recent development and has not contributed to the increase in financial 
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vulnerability as captured by our model. The relatively weak performance of the bank foreign 
liabilities indicator can be surprising, since the CEECs' banking sector is dominated by 
international groups. The reasons for this can be found in the strong predominance of domestic 
sources in credit financing over the studied period.  
Generally speaking, we can stress the fact that sources of financial vulnerability change 
over time with countries’ economic development and challenges ahead. In this way, the impact 
of variables such as inflation or external indebtedness has weakened due to their more stable 
trend in most of the CEEC economies. On the other hand, the importance of variables like 
domestic credit growth (Cottarelli et al., 2003), current account deficit or capital account 
volatility (Schadler et al., 2005) can be considered as the most important potential sources of 
vulnerability for the present and the future.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this work we used the non-linear binary panel model to determine the sources of 
financial vulnerability in four Central and Eastern European countries.  The incontestable 
advantages of applying this method, especially in the case of the relatively short data span for 
the CEECs’ economies, associated with some elements of the non-parametric approach used 
during the initial selection of indicators, allow us to accomplish this objective.  
Our work is obviously based on an empirical analysis, using standard research 
approaches to treat the complicated problems of financial crises. Like other studies in the field, 
this method has good in-sample performance, but should not be used to predict financial 
turbulence. Indeed, methods based on previous experiences to select crisis indicators have 
rather weak predictive power, measured by out-of-sample performance of the models, when 
anticipating future financial turbulence.  
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Despite these limitations, the approach provides useful and supportive instruments for 
the study of financial vulnerability in transition economies.  This is especially true when 
looking at the recent situation in most CEECs. Some indicators of financial vulnerability, as 
developed in previous studies and put forward in this work, have signaled a visible 
deterioration of their financial and economic situation. However, this development did not draw 
enough attention either from academic economists or financial markets until at least the third 
quarter of 2008, when a visible worsening of the global financial situation made everyone more 
attentive to the potential crisis-driving signs in transition economies.  
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APPENDIX A 
Calculating the noise-to-signal ratio 
 
Consider the following situations12: 
A: the variable predicts a crisis and the crisis occurs within four quarters (good “on” signal) 
B: the variable predicts a crisis, but no crisis occurs during the signaling period (false crisis 
signal)  
C: the variable does not predict a crisis, but a crisis occurs (missed crisis signal or false calm 
signal)  
D: The variable does not predict a crisis and no crisis occurs (good “off” signal)  
  
 These four situations are summarized in the following matrix:  
 
 
 
We define the following test:   
 
                       (7) 
 
or  
                                                 
12 For a more detailed analysis see Andreou, Dufrénot, Sand-Zantman, Zdzienicka (2007).  
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(8) 
 
A type I error of this test is the probability of rejecting H0 when it is true and is defined 
as  . A type II error is the probability of accepting H0 when H1 is true, that is  
P( ). The noise-to-signal ratio is defined as the ratio of type II errors over 1 minus type I 
errors:  
                  (9) 
 
 
The noise-to-signal ratio is thus the ratio of false signals to good signals. A macroeconomic 
variable is considered as a good warning indicator of a currency crisis if this ratio has values 
near 0. Accordingly, the threshold to be selected must minimize the above ratio. To do this, 
we use the quantiles of the variable X and retain those yielding the lowest value of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
APPENDIX B 
Variables description 
 
- Commercial Balance /GDP - the ratio of the twelve-month change of exports and imports to 
nominal GDP. 
- Current Account /GDP - the ratio of the twelve-month change of the current account 
balance to nominal GDP. 
- External Debt/GDP - the ratio of external debt at the end of a period over the nominal GDP, 
twelve-month variation. 
- Equity / Debt Ratio - the ratio of equity to debt, twelve-month variation. 
- FDI/GDP - the ratio of foreign domestic investment to nominal GDP, twelve-month variation. 
- Short-Term Capital Inflows - the ratio of the twelve-month change in portfolio investments 
to nominal GDP.  
- Domestic Credit /GDP - the ratio of the twelve-month change in domestic credit to nominal 
GDP.  
- Banking Credit to the Private Sector - the ratio of domestic bank claims on the private 
sector as a share of nominal GDP, twelve-month variation.  
- Foreign Liabilities in the Banking Sector - foreign liabilities of domestic banks, twelve-
month variation. 
- Commercial Banks Deposits - the sum of commercial banks' demand deposits and other 
deposits, twelve-month variation. 
- Real Exchange Rate Appreciation - the real effective exchange rate, twelve-month 
variation (base year: 1996) - increase means appreciation. 
- Exchange Rate Deviation from Linear Trend - deviation of the real exchange rate from 
its linear trend (base year: 1996). 
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- Exchange Rate Volatility - measured as the square root of the monthly exchange rate 
average and its standard deviation. 
- Growth - the twelve-month change in nominal GDP. 
- Financial Liberalization - measured by the decrease in the spread between lending and 
deposit rates. 
- Financial Account Volatility - the standard deviation of net annual capital inflows. 
- Inflation - twelve-month variation of the consumer price index. 
- Interest Rate volatility - the standard deviation of period-by-period change in the money 
market rate. 
- M2/GDP - the ratio of the twelve-month change of M2 to nominal GDP. 
- Emerging Markets Financial Situation - calculated on the basis of the monthly EMBI. 
- Russian Crisis - dummy indictor of increased financial vulnerability in Russia, constructed 
as our IFV indicator in formulae (1) to (3).  
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APPENDIX C 
Exchange Rate Regimes in the CEECs 
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